Prevention and protection against environmental, occupational and food-related chemical hazards has been the primary goal of quantitative methods increasingly applied over the past thirty years to assess human health risks posed by environmental chemical contaminants. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] Protective regulatory and industrial hygiene measures do not ordinarily require unbiased prediction of chemical risks or resulting casualties. Extensive human pharmacokinetic, epidemiological and/or clinical-trial data-that have allowed reasonably accurate risk assessment for agents such as ionizing radiation and medical pharmaceuticals-simply do not exist for most toxic industrial chemicals and other chemical threat agents. Consequently, assessments of environmental chemical risk generally entail substantial toxicity dose-response uncertainties, due to unavoidable reliance in many cases on quite limited laboratory animal data. To address such uncertainties, health-protective assessment methods traditionally have involved routine application of "uncertainty" factors designed to guarantee acceptable levels of minimal risk. 6 However, a number of less biased approaches are preferable.
Best estimates of toxic chemical risks and casualties require unbiased characterization, rather than precautionary adjustments for, any and all underlying uncertainties. An unbiased approach to chemical toxicity assessment is appropriate in a number of decision making contexts. In judicial settings, for example, a fair and timely verdict must be reached in each case.
In the U.S., reasonably fair assessments of environmental chemical harm, albeit approached through a deliberately adversarial process, are thus regularly attempted in civil "toxic tort" litigation, and at times also in criminal prosecutions. In judicial settings, quantitative risk methods are increasingly employed by expert witnesses to help meet civil "more likely than not" or criminal "beyond a reasonable doubt" legal standards of evidence, constrained by the requirement to be persuasive to a lay jury. Timely and unbiased assessment of chemical threats 4 and casualties can also be important for effective insurance and disaster planning. In general, such unbiased assessment is needed whenever circumstances require choosing among, trading off or prioritizing options associated with different chemical risks or different combinations of chemical and other risks. 7 This is perhaps most dramatically the case in urgent military or emergency response circumstances.
This paper focuses on the present need for more effective methods of timely and unbiased chemical risk assessment specifically to support domestic emergency response management.
The need for assessment methods to support trade-off decisions, in addition to currently supported traditional protection-oriented decisions, is discussed in Section 1. Section 2 discusses why current approaches fail to provide effective and timely support of trade-off decisions involving chemical risks. The importance of bridging historically divergent professional perspectives to successful development and implementation of new methods to support environmental health triage when needed for domestic emergency response is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 summarizes recent National Research Council (NRC) recommendations directed at the analogous problem of how best to support military coarse-of-action decisions that involve chemical risks. A default approach to modeling integrated risk posed by dynamic respiratory exposure to one or more chemicals is outlined in Section 5. Section 6 offers suggested steps toward an additional, unbiased framework for toxic chemical risk assessment to support more effective risk-based homeland security planning and consequence management.
Risk-Based Emergency Response Should Support Both Protection and Triage
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 mandates the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to support research and development of technology and systems for "detecting, preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist attacks;" to help "ensure the Relative merit will be assessed most conveniently using a unified measure, or set of severitylevel-specific measures, such as net cases averted, net cases averted per available dollar spent, net quality-adjusted years of life gained per dollar spent, etc. The numerator of such a metric may, if desired, be raised to a power >1 in order to reflect risk aversion.
Defining a casualty metric, or set of metrics, useful for environmental health triage is not a trivial problem, and adopting any such definition is a risk-policy decision that should fairly reflect broad societal preferences and input. Clearly, acute and severe casualties (such as deaths, or person-years lost) that are fairly straightforward to aggregate will tend to be a dominant concern. But, for purposes that require comparisons, estimates for these endpoints may need to be aggregated with associated subacute and/or less severe injuries. It may be difficult to agree on the relative importance of averting different types of injury, ranging from sub-lethal to lethal.
Additional complicating factors-such as temperature dependence of severity for some types of injury, injurious or lethal secondary effects of certain casualty types or circumstances, and the relative value of averting acute vs. delayed injury or death, to name but a few-increase the difficulties likely to be involved in reaching consensus on rules and definitions to be used for 8 unavoidable environmental health triage. However, the price of failing to adopt such rules and definitions will be to prevent risk-based emergency response, and so increase the likelihood of missed opportunities to prevent many unnecessary casualties. The required rules and definitions need not have Talmudic complexity, when a simple approach may suffice as a reasonable basis to prevent gross errors in triage strategy.
Systems that integrate emergency response data with tools for analysis, visualization, GIS- Atmospheric dispersion modelers have widely adopted this NAC philosophy concerning utility One such factor applied routinely to develop AEGLs and similar guidelines for chemical non-cancer risks, is the so-called "intraspecies uncertainty" factor sometimes denoted UF H (10 by default, unless data justify using 3 or 1). 6, 11, 16 This factor is applied to account for the range of interindividual variability (i.e, heterogeneity or differences) in sensitivity or susceptibility to toxic response that is expected in a general human population.
,11 (p. 80)
It reflects a default assumption concerning the typical ratio of chemical concentration eliciting a specified toxic endpoint in relatively susceptible individuals or subpopulations (e.g., due to age, health status, genetics, etc.), to that eliciting the same endpoint in average healthy humans. 16 Susceptibilityrelated variation addressed by UF H , concerning a chemical toxicity risk R relative to its population-average value † R , is completely irrelevant to estimating the expected value E(N) of the number N of casualties (i.e., "population risk") for any exposed population, because by definition E(N) = N † R ; moreover, exact knowledge of a UF H -variability distribution is typically of little or no value because, if considered to be of interest, the corresponding N-uncertainty distribution is typically very well approximated as a Poisson-binomial function of † R alone. [17] [18] [19] In addition to safety/"uncertainty" factors, AEGLs for non-cancer endpoints incorporate two systematically "conservative" (health-protective) assumptions. First, a conservative toxicity endpoint is used to estimate toxic response. For example, subclinical endpoints are among those used to derive AEGL-2 guidelines, which are intended to prevent "irreversible or other serious 11 long-lasting health effects or an impaired ability to escape" 11 (p. 35) ; and lower-bound response endpoints-such as a lethal concentration (LC) to 1% or 5%, or an arbitrary fraction of the LC to 50%, of exposed animals-are used to derive AEGL-3 guidelines (the most protective category of AEGL guidelines), which are intended to prevent "life-threatening health effects or death" in a general population including sensitive individuals.
11 (p. 35) Second, by default when data are unavailable or inadequate, a conservative value is assumed for the exponent n used to extrapolate response vs. exposure duration from the generalized Haber's law relation, C n t = k (e.g., n = 3 is assumed to extrapolate from an observed longer to an estimated shorter exposure duration). 
Integrating Two Paradigms Requires Bridging Two Professional Perspectives
Scientific and regulatory bodies have not clearly and consistently communicated the fact that effective environmental health protection requires toxicity characterizations different from those required for effective environmental health triage. This is unfortunate, but understandable. National leadership could help to bridge different agencies and professional perspectives that must work together to realize an effective system of risk-based consequence management. The fact that triage and protection paradigms neither conflict with nor detract from one another, but rather clearly have the same objective to prevent unnecessary harm, will help build this bridge.
Chemical Risks to Deployed Military Personnel: An Analogous Problem
Congressional concern about Gulf War troops' toxic exposures led to a series of National DOD developed and implemented not the recommended dual-paradigm framework, but a single set of "military exposure guidelines" (MEGs) to serve as a comprehensive approach to managing chemical risks to deployed military personnel. 12 MEGs are modified versions of preexisting, protectively biased chemical exposure guidelines, with greatest weight given to AEGLs in the case of chemicals for which AEGLs are available. 12 The modifications used do not include any (even context-dependent) reference to "best" estimates of likely casualties, only military-specific adjustments concerning exposure (e.g., water intake) and susceptibility (e.g., among relatively healthy, but also some potentially pregnant, adults). 12 The MEGs, and a system of corresponding qualitative risk-ranking procedures, together were developed explicitly to serve as a unified system with which DOD pursues two different requirements: (1) force health protection, and (2) coarse-of-action (COA) decisions in support of specific (including non-combat) military missions.
12
After careful review of DOD's single-paradigm, MEG-based framework to manage chemical risks to deployed troops, the NRC recently recommended that DOD scrap this system in favor of a dual-paradigm framework. 29 The newly proposed framework involves one set of methods and guidelines for making force health protection decisions, and a different set for Being predictive rather than protective in design, the proposed CCEGs would be appropriate for helping to make trade-offs or set priorities concerning chemical risks, in relation to each other as well as additional operational threats.
The joint objectives of force health protection and effective COA decisions, which DOD seeks to address through a framework for the assessment and management of chemical risks to deployed personnel, are directly analogous to requirements for environmental health protection and for environmental health triage, respectively, in a domestic homeland-security context.
Consequently, the key point of the recent NRC recommendation summarized above-that a fundamentally new, predictive methods and guidelines are needed to support triage decisions involving chemical risks-applies directly to the problem of how to implement effective, riskbased planning and consequence management for homeland security situations that may involve widespread and/or complex chemical exposure scenarios.
Assessing Risks from Exposure to Time-Varying Chemical Concentrations
For the purpose of implementing CCEGs, the approach NRC recommended is similar to that taken to develop AEGLs, except that each CCEG would incorporate adjustment ("uncertainty")
factors only insofar as they make casualty predictions more accurate. CCEGs would thus summarize information needed to predict total casualties, rather than concentrations likely to prevent nearly all casualties. For quantitative chemical risk assessment, the NRC recommended the log-probit dose-response model as a default approach to analyze available data on each toxicity endpoint of interest. 29 (pp. 86-87) By this model, the probability P of individual response, 19 conditional on exposure to concentration C for a specified duration T o , may be expressed conveniently as
where C o and C f denote values of C at which 50% and 100f% responses, respectively, are estimated from the best available data (with 0<f<1), where b is defined implicitly, and where 
Eq. (2) is equivalent to a generalized Haber's law (C n T = constant) relation in which the "toxic
denotes the duration of exposure at concentration C o estimated to yield a 100f% response. All three fitted parameters of Eq. (2) are readily available only for a few endpoints and chemicals, such as lethality for chlorine gas and a number of other respiratory toxicants. 31, [33] [34] More often, related estimates may be reported in the form C o , C f and T f , conditional on T o . In either case, the corresponding probability of response at time t may be expressed conveniently as 20
where n was defined above, d is defined implicitly, and a = -log( † , such a new approach should be developed through a process that involves scientific peer review. Active and coordinated involvement by federal agencies tasked with supporting emergency response would also clearly contribute to progress toward new data structures and methods to support effective environmental health triage.
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